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Long-term deals are one tool that both players and franchises use to manage risk. That
tool has been much discussed and empirically tested with respect to player shirking, and has
more briefly, and only theoretically, discussed with respect to reducing variance in future
payrolls. Our work looks at how patterns of use of long-term contracts are affected by changes in
contracting rules established through collective bargaining and by expected changes in franchise
revenue streams. To accomplish this, we have assembled the most complete dataset of MLB
player contracts to date. We analyze changes in contract length and dollar value across players of
different ability levels, at different points in their careers (contract status), by position, across
CBA agreements, and further examine if new stadiums and new television deals impact contract
terms. We confirm the earlier finding that player performance is systematically higher during
contract years than during the early portion of a long-term contract. We also find that inclusion
of contract length information significantly reduces the unexplained variation in player salaries.
JEL Classification Codes: L83
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I.  Introduction 
 
Our topic of interest is the use of long-term labor contracts; we are not the first to use 
sports data for this purpose.  As early as Rottenberg (1956) and eloquently summarized 
by Kahn (2000), researchers wishing to analyze labor markets have understood the 
opportunities provided by the widespread availability of productivity and salary measures 
for professional athletes.  While past research has utilized the abundant performance data 
available, recent advances in performance measures made by sabermetricians, 
statistically minded members of the Society of American Baseball Researchers (SABR), 
cast a shadow on the results of past literature that utilized performance measures that 
have been subsequently shown to be flawed.
1  Further, due to data availability issues, 
those studies that involve long-term contracting issues in baseball, which will be outlined 
below, typically use only a limited sample period or a non-random subset of contracts.  
Our work seeks to rectify these shortcomings.   
 
The contribution of this paper is to improve the empirical work on contracting in baseball 
by first utilizing a superior performance measure, but more importantly, by constructing 
an exhaustive dataset containing the contract status of nearly all players who played 
between the 1985 and 2007 season seasons, inclusive.
2 The result of combining this new 
data with existing salary and performance measures is a complete dataset of performance 
measure, salary, and contract details for 23 seasons.     
 
Nearly all the modern research on long-term contracting in baseball acknowledges that 
utilizing long-term contracts involves risk (and mitigating risk) from both the player’s 
perspective and their employer’s perspective.  Further, researchers acknowledge that 
differences in contracting outcomes result from changes in the degree of monopsonistic 
exploitation across a player’s career and across time due to changes in the economic 
conditions facing teams and players.  However, due to data limitations, the way 
researchers often control for these differences is to limit the sample to players who are 
homogeneous with regard to such characteristic.  For example, Krautmann and 
Oppenheimer (2002) limit their analysis to free agents from 1990 to 1994, and in doing 
so are comparing players with like bargaining ability operating in like economic 
environments.   
 
Our more inclusive dataset allows us to explore additional issues.  As our dataset spans 
collective bargaining agreements, we are able to examine to what extent the institutional 
context under which players and clubs are operating affects the use of long-term 
contracts.  We are able to examine how long-term contracting differs across a number of 
different measures, including, but not limited to: negotiating constraints (bargaining 
status), playing ability, age, defensive positions, and market size.  Further, with an 
                                                 
1 While the raw statistics that are components in the calculations of performance have been available, it is 
the translation of these inputs into a single performance measure that has been markedly improved by 
sabermetricians.  See Burger and Walters (2008) for a similar argument. 
 
2 Our salary data consists of all players on Opening Day rosters, so some marginal players who never made 
an Opening Day roster may be omitted.  
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increased sample size and additional degrees of freedom we can re-examine several 
topics in explored in previous liteature.  Among these, we will in this paper (i) note how 
performance varies across and within contracts, enabling us to add to the literature on 
shirking, and (ii) examine how deal length affects the standard Scully model of pay and 
performance, with an eye to evaluating competing theories of the “winner’s curse” and 
risk management strategies.  Additionally, unlike much of the previous literature, we 
analyze both batters and pitchers, and use superior performance measures.          
 
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows:  Section II briefly reviews 
the previous literature, paying particular attention to the work done on long-term 
contracting and the associated incentive effects.  Section III briefly describes the creation 
of our dataset, and provides a number of summary statistics to familiarize the reader with 
our dataset and our subsequent controls.  Section IV provides multivariate empirical 
results, using OLS regression to provide evidence of shirking in long-term contracts, and 
utilizing probit and ordered probit analysis to determine the probability a player is signed 
to a long-term contract.  Section V analyzes salary as a function of contract length and 
other controls in the spirit of Scully (1974).  Section VI concludes, and outlines our 
future plans for research.    
 
II.  Literature Review 
 
As we will demonstrate empirically in this paper, not all long-term contracts are signed 
by players that are free agents; however, much of the empirical work on contracting in 
baseball has either dealt directly with the effect of free agency on both salary and contract 
length, or the degree to which salary is suppressed before a player becomes a free agent, 
including the seminal work by Rottenberg (1956).  The 1975 Messersmith / McNally 
decision that loosened the reserve clause, a contractual provision that ensured a player 
could negotiate with only one team, provided a natural experiment for economists and led 
to a number of studies on baseball’s labor market.
3  While these works certainly involve 
pay and performance and implicitly contracts, these works are less directed in the use of 
contracts per se than they are directed at the issue of monopsonistic exploitation and 
salary determination.  Kahn (1993) was the first to use panel data methods, and found 
that both arbitration eligibility and free agency led to increased compensation, while only 
free agency increased the duration of contracts. 
 
A second line of research that more closely resembles our current work are studies that 
consider the costs of using contracts, and therefore analyze the risk to both contracting 
parties and incentive effects.  The seminal work in this line of research was Lehn (1982), 
who demonstrated time spent on the disabled list increased coincident with proliferation 
of long-term contracts.  This result is consistent with shirking, but may also be viewed as 
consistent with management of risk from the employer’s perspective.
4  Krautmann (1990) 
                                                 
3 For baseball, see Sommers and Quinton (1982), Raimando (1983), Scott, Long, and Somppi (1985), and 
Kahn (1993).   
 
4 A shortcoming of this work is that the Lehn analyzed only aggregate data and encompassed a relatively 
short period of time.    
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suggests that the observed performance declines in the first year could simply be a result 
of stochastic variation or regression to the mean.
5  If owners are simply Bayesian 
updaters, a team will rationally update the mean performance level of a player that has a 
positive draw, and a reduction in performance levels during the first year of a long-term 
contract is not necessarily shirking.  Scoggins (1993) criticizes Krautmann by noting that 
the shirking issue is highly sensitive to the performance measure used.
6  Marburger 
(2003) compares modern free agents with matched players who played under the reserve 
clause, and finds evidence that players with long-term contracts do not outperform 
comparable
 reserve era players over the same time frame.  
 
There are three papers that warrant special attention in regard to our current undertaking.  
Krautmann and Oppenheimer (2002) look explicitly at the relationship between player 
salaries and contract length.  The authors suggest players are more risk averse than 
owners, and thus are willing to tradeoff salary for longer contracts.  They allow players’ 
return to performance to vary with contract duration and correct for the simultaneity of 
contract length and salary by utilizing two-stage least squares, finding that returns to 
performance decline with contract length.  The sample utilized is all potential free agent 
position players that signed new contracts between 1990 and 1994, while the 
performance metric utilized is slugging average. 
 
The second is Maxcy, Fort, and Krautmann (2002) who look for ex-ante strategic 
behavior, defined as increasing performance in the last year before a new contract is 
signed, and ex-post strategic behavior, defined as reducing performance in the first year 
after a contract is signed.  They compare performance to its three-year moving average in 
both the single year before or the single year after a new contract is negotiated.  Their 
dataset contains roughly 2700 observations on 353 players, and their preferred 
performance metrics are slugging average for hitters, and K / BB ratio for pitchers.  They 
find that both batters and pitchers spend significantly less time on the disabled list and  
have significantly above average playing time in the year prior to the contract 
negotiations, but find that performance is not statistically different in either the year 
before or year after the new contract.  They suggest that incentive mechanisms are 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5 Krautmann’s argument is straightforward.  If production is stochastic, and owners are simply Bayesian 
updaters of a player’s unobservable underlying talent level, a team will rationally update the mean 
performance level of a player that has had a positive draw from the production distribution.  If this positive 
draw occurs in the season directly before a new contract is signed, we would expect to observe that the 
level of performance in the following year (where shirking is said to be most likely to observe) to be below 
the of the previous “contract” year.   However, as we will point out below, if this is indeed the case, 
subsequent seasons in a player’s long-term contract should also be expected to below the performance level 
of the contract year. 
 
6 While this response is in part related to the fact that the literature had not settled on a performance 
measure, and of course these researchers did not have the recent sabermetric developments at their disposal, 
an additional issue in this discussion is that Krautmann used a performance measure that is an “average” 
statistic (not directly dependent on playing time), while Scoggins used a performance measure that is a 
“count” statistic (directly dependent on playing time).  This distinction is important if one views the 
propensity to be injured or sitting out as a form of shirking.      
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sufficient to overcome the propensity to shirk.  We perform a similar analysis later in this 
work.         
 
 
The third is Maxcy (2004), which is motivated by the empirical result of Maxcy (1997).
7  
Maxcy (2004) criticizes Lehn (1982) and Kahn (1993) for their assumption that the 
player’s willingness to insure motivates long-term contracts.  As Maxcy points out, 
however, marginal players, who would seem especially likely to wish to purchase an 
“insurance policy” are rarely observed as signing long-term contracts.  Therefore, Maxcy 
presents a theoretical model in which long-term contracts are desirable to the club in 
order to mitigate both market uncertainty and uncertainty about employee’s future 
productivity.  While Maxcy acknowledges the desire for player to insure, in his model, 
any player with any degree of risk aversion will always prefer a long-term deal to a series 
of spot contracts.    
 
The main proposition of Maxcy’s model is that teams will prefer long-term contracts 
when the uncertainty in regard to the price of labor services is high relative to the 
uncertainty in production.  He argues that as a player proceeds through his career and 
obtains additional negotiation power through arbitration and ultimately free-agency, the 
uncertainty in regard to the price of that player’s labor services increases.  Therefore, 
price uncertainty is measured empirically by a series of dummy variables indicating 
negotiation status, while production uncertainty is measured as the standard deviation of 
past performance measures.  Maxcy then estimates a binary choice probit, where the 
dependent variable is indicator for long term deal, and corrects for Heckman style 
selection with a two-step estimation by estimating the probability the player will stay 
with his current team.  The empirical results show that increases in price uncertainty lead 
to an increased probability of a long-term contract, but only limited support for the 
production uncertainty measure.
8         
 
III.  Data 
 
IIIA.  Sources 
 
As salary data is not reliably available before the 1985 season, we limit our sample to the 
1985-2007 seasons, inclusive.  Salary data is acquired from Sean Lahman’s database, 
                                                 
7 Maxcy (1997) shows that despite the prevailing view of the literature that players are willing to accept a 
wage that is below the spot wage in exchange for a guaranteed long-term wage, there is no empirical 
evidence of lower wages associated with long-term contracts.  Maxcy (1997) begins with a dataset 
containing contracts of most players who were under contract between 1986 and 1993, finding 337 long 
term contracts for position players, 208 for pitchers.  While this analysis is similar in spirit to what we 
undertake here, our dataset is a larger sample, spanning more years, and will use a superior performance 
metric.   
 
8 The dataset utilized is the same as reported in the previous footnote concerning Maxcy (1997), and thus is 
subject to the same criticism.  Maxcy also reports that low revenue clubs are more likely to offer long-term 
contracts to position players, a result counter to one we report in a subsequent section.    
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version 5.5.
9  Individual salary information is supplemented by information on opening 
day team payrolls available from Rodney Fort’s website (years prior to 2004), and the 
USAToday baseball salary database (2005 – 2007).
10  Components necessary to calculate 
the performance metrics utilized (OPS and OPS against) are collected from Sean 
Lahman’s website, and supplemented with player demographic information available 
from Retrosheet.
11  Information on timing of new stadiums is acquired from Hakes and 
Clapp (2005).  Means of the variables above are reported in Table 2.     
 
The primary sources for contracts are Cot’s Contracts website (hereafter Cot’s), and a 
MLB transaction database available from Professional Sports Transactions Archive, 
(hereafter PSTA).
12  Cot’s provides thorough coverage of the latter part of the sample.  
PSTA provides transactions throughout the period, but transaction coverage varies from 
season to season, in both depth and detail.  We begin with a player’s performance history, 
and attempt to construct the player’s contract status in each season in which we observe 
performance data.  If Cot’s or PSTA reports a contract, for example, of length three years 
in 1987, we code the contract as a 3-year deal signed in 1987.  Some of subsequent 
empirical work utilizes contracts as the unit of observation, while other work utilizes the 
player-season.  This transaction would lead to one observation in the former (the contract 
signed in 1987), and would be related to three observations in the latter (the observation 
for the player-season in 1987, 1988, and 1989).  Absent information about restructuring 
or extensions, we assume this contract remains in force for the duration of the contract as 
observed.   
 
Where PSTA and Cot’s were silent on contracts, a series of Lexis / Nexis searches was 
conducted in major US and Canadian newspapers.
13  Where we can find evidence of a 
contract being signed in newsprint, we include this information in the dataset.  After an 
exhaustive search, players for whom no information can be found are assumed to have 
signed one-year contracts.  However, we are quite confident that we have located more 
than 90% of the long-term contracts.
14  All told, we are able to locate 929 contracts of 
                                                 
9 The site is http://www.baseball1.com.  
 
10 These sites are http://www.rodneyfort.com/SportsData/BizFrame.htm and 
http://content.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/salaries/default.aspx, respectively.   
 
11 The site is http://www.retrosheet.org. 
 
12 These sites are http://mlbcontracts.blogspot.com/ and http://www.prosportstransactions.com, 
respectively. 
 
13 While our methods evolved as we experimented, the vast majority of our searchers were conducted by 
searching for the player’s name (in quotation marks) within 8 words of the word “contract” in major US 
and Canadian newspapers.  Returned articles were then read for relevant transaction data.  Many 
transactions were located from “Transaction” articles, listing multiple transactions for multiple teams, 
though information was often found in articles specific to a team’s preseason outlook, articles about 
individual player contract negotiations, season summaries, and others.          
 
14 Throughout the remainder of the paper, long-term contracts are defined as contracts that are two years of 
length or longer.  While it is impossible to know how many contracts that we have missed, we do also 
observe the salary history of players, which indicates situations in which it was particularly likely or  
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two years or more for batters, and 667 contracts of two years or more for pitchers, 
numbers much larger than any previous study in the existing literature.
15  A summary of 
the contracts included in our dataset is provided in Table 1.  The table clearly shows that 
position players (batters) are more likely to receive long-term deals, defined as deals of 
length greater than or equal to two years, compared to pitchers.  The distribution of deal 
length is highly right-skewed for both batters and pitchers, with the dispersion for batters 
being wider than that of pitchers.   
 
III.B  Cross Tabulations 
 
In order to get a sense of the types and frequencies of contracts, we present a series of 
cross-tabulations.  Of course, the cross-tabulations provide only a univariate analysis of 
the conditions affecting the determination of contract length.  We subsequently properly 
control for factors and their interactions by performing multivariate regression analyses, 
yet we present the cross tabs as they simultaneously motivate our later empirical work 
and introduce the richness of out dataset.  It is important to note that in Tables 3 through 
6 below, the unit of observation is a contract, rather than a player-season.  Of course, 
long-term contracts can span CBA regimes, age groups, and even involve position 
changes.  We use the information for the first season for which the contract is in force, as 
these are the conditions that were relevant at the time of contract negotiation.
16   
 
Table 3a displays the number of contracts, by deal length and age group for batters, while 
Table 3b displays analogous information for pitchers.  What is clear from Table 3a is that 
very few of the youngest position players receive long-term contracts; as players gain 
arbitration and free-agent eligibility, a larger fraction of contracts signed are long-term 
deals.  Even in the 26 – 29 age group category, as many players are making considerable 
bargaining gains, just less than 90% of deals are less than two years in length.
17   
Conditioned on age group, the fraction of deals that are long-term reaches its peak for the 
30-33 age group, and this fraction falls as players age.  More than 40% of those contracts 
of 5 years of length or longer are held by players in the 26-29 age group and nearly 30% 
are held by players in the 30-33 age group.  Table 3b shows similar patterns for pitchers, 
though two notable differences are the relative scarcity of contracts of five years of length 
or longer for pitchers and the fact that amongst the oldest age group, pitchers are more 
                                                                                                                                                 
unlikely to find a long-term contract, increasing our confidence that we have found most of the long-term 
deals.  Further increasing our confidence is the fact that cases for which we did have remaining gaps in 
player’s contract history are predominantly found at the beginning of a player’s career, for marginal players 
or both.  There remains a small portion of players for whom we have not conducted an exhaustive search of 
contract history.  In future work, we will complete the search process for these players.  
 
15 As we will see below, unlike previous studies that limit their analysis to free agents, we capture a large 
number of long-term contracts for players that are unlikely to have achieved free agent status.   
 
16 For example, consider a player who signed a 4-year contract in the off-season between the 1994 and 
1995 and would be 29 years old on opening day of the 1995 season.  In our dataset, this player would be 
coded as belonging to the 1995 – 2001 CBA regime and 26-29 group, as the deal was signed in 1995 and 
the age at the beginning of the first season of the deal is 29. 
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likely to receive a long-term deal than similarly aged batters.  As with the batters, those 
pitchers with that receive the longest deals are in the 26-29 and 30-33 age group.  
Together, the information suggests that players’ contract length is constrained by their 
limited bargaining status early in their careers, and contract length is constrained by the 
onset of diminished skills associated with aging late in their careers.    
 
Table 4a classifies contracts by deal length and defensive position for batters.  The null 
hypothesis of independence between deal length and defensive positions for batters is 
rejected at the 5% significance level.  Catchers sign relatively more 2-year contracts more 
other positional players, but sign fewer contracts of length longer than three years; for 
shortstops, the pattern is reversed.  Of the contracts of three years or more, first basemen 
and outfielders are overrepresented, while catchers and second baseman are 
underrepresented.  Table 4b displays similar information for pitchers, revealing that 
starting pitchers and closers are much more likely to receive long-term deals than other 
pitchers.
18  Another pattern that is revealed is, amongst starting pitchers, left-handed 
starters negotiate longer contracts.  Almost 10% of left-handed starters have contracts of 
three years or longer, while for right handed starters, the corresponding figure is just 
7%.
19   
 
Tables 5a and Table 5b report contracts by deal length and Collective Bargaining 
Agreement regime (CBA regime), for batters and pitchers, respectively.
20  A striking 
feature is the paucity of contracts signed under the 1986 – 1989 CBA, the so-called 
collusion era, as fewer than 5 percent of contracts signed for both position player sand 
hitters between 1986 and 1989 were long-term deals.
21  Amongst batters, the fraction of 
players signing long-term deals shows a broad increase after the collusion era, displaying 
only a slight decline between the 1995 – 01 and 2002 – 06 CBA regimes.  For pitchers, 
the fraction of contracts signed that are long-term has increased and uninterrupted fashion 
after the collusion era.     
   
                                                 
18 Starting pitchers are defined as players for whom more than half of their appearances are starts, while 
relief pitchers (closers) are defined as players for whom more than half of their appearances are games 
finished. 
 
19 This pattern appears to be evident for closers.  However, one should use caution in drawing inferences as 
there are very few long-term contracts signed by left-handed closers.   
 
20 Contracts are coded based on the year (CBA regime) in which the contract was signed.  Because our 
player statistics sample begins in 1985, contracts coded as belonging to the 1981 – 1985 CBA are based on 
those players for whom we observe performance statistics in 1985 and who signed a contract that begins in 
the 1985 season or began in a season prior to 1985.  Thus, our sample contains all players who signed 
contracts (and played) in 1985, including both one year contracts and long-term contracts signed in 1985.  
However, also included are players who signed two-year contracts in 1984 (but not one-year contracts 
signed in 1984), and three-year contracts in 1983 (but not one or two-year contracts in 1983), and so on.  
This “grandfathering” results in a selection bias – the composition of contracts is the 1981-1985 is selected 
towards those with longer contracts, which would tend to bias the results of the test of independence 
between deal length and CBA regime.  However, when the test of independence is conducting, omitting the 
1981-1985 CBA regime, the p-value is again 0.000.   
 
21 For additional details on collusion, see Bruggink and Rose (1990).  
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Tables 6a and 6b offers a preliminary analysis of potential differential use of long-term 
contracts by teams of different market sizes.  In these tables, we examine years remaining 
on a contract rather than length of the contract, and thus the unit of observation is no 
longer a contract, but instead a player season.  While an examination of contact length by 
payroll category would enable us to determine if teams with large payrolls sign players to 
longer contracts (which will later be shown to be correlated with high quality players), 
the switch to years remaining on contracts also allows the possibility that these large 
payroll teams acquire players with longer contracts who were originally signed by other 
teams.  This switch allows us to consider the Coasian conjecture that the distribution of 
talent should be independent of the initial ownership of these resources.  The results 
suggests that low payroll teams have fewer of their position players “locked up” for long 
periods relative to high payroll teams, a result in contast to that reported by Maxcy 
(2004).  This pattern is also observed for pitchers, with high payroll teams having a larger 
fraction of players under contract for long periods.  The null hypothesis of an 
independent distribution of years remaining on contract and salary category is soundly 
rejected at the 1% significance level.   
 
Table 7a and 7b reports a cross-tab of years remaining on contract by bargaining era, 
echoing the results of Table 4a and 4b.  Fewer player-seasons are observed with more 
than 4 years remaining on the player contract during the 1986-1989 collusion period, and 
fewer pitchers have many years remaining compared to batters.      
 
Table 8 lends support to the result that better players receive longer contracts, confirming 
a finding reported by Krautmann and Oppenheimer (2002) and Maxcy (2004), amongst 
others.  Players were assigned to performance quintiles based on their best qualifying 
season such that 20 percent of player-seasons are assigned to each quintile.  Performance 
quintile 1 (q1) includes those players with the lowest peak performance levels, typically 
journeyman players, while performance quintile 5 (q5) represents players with the highest 
peak performance.  Players who never reach the qualifying levels in any of their seasons, 
130 at bats for hitters and 130 batters faced for pitchers, are not assigned to a quintile.
22  
Table 8 the proportion of player-seasons for which a player is in the last year of their 
contract declines as higher ability players are examined.  Because of the fact that better 
players get longer contracts, they are less likely than marginal players to be in their 
“contract year”.  The pattern is similar fro both batters and pitchers, though the reduction 
is less dramatic as pitching quality increases, a consequence of the infrequency with 
which very long-term contracts are observed for pitchers.              
 
IV.  Multivariate Analysis of Contracts    
 
IV.A.  Shirking  
                                                 
22 The number of players in each performance quintile is not equal because players are assigned on the 
basis of their peak season’s performance.  The value of peak OPS that would result in exactly 20% of 
player-seasons being assigned to each performance quintile is first calculated.  In some cases, a player’s 
career spans this value, resulting in a slight deviation from 20% of player seasons being assigned to each 
quintile.   
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In order to properly investigate the possibility of shirking by players who have received 
longer contracts, it is important to establish an appropriate basis of comparison for 
players’ expected performance over the length of the contract.  As has been well 
established by many researchers, there is a systematic pattern of player development and 
deterioration that can be observed through a player’s career, with a peak at about age 27.  
More recent research has shown that pattern is more pronounced for hitters of the highest 
level of peak ability.
 23 
 
The data set contains 6558 instances of consecutive qualifying seasons for hitters, and 
5719 such instances for pitchers.  An observation of the “first difference” in OPS is 
possible for each of those instances.  The contingent means of those first differences in 
OPS by age group and ability quintile for the 6558 pairs of hitter player-seasons are 
displayed in Panel A of Table 9, with the corresponding contingent means for the pitchers 
first differences in OPS shown in Panel B. 
 
Among players of the highest quality (q5), OPS is increasing by over 0.040 a year for 
players in their early twenties, and by more than 0.025 a year at ages 24 and 25 before 
plateauing in the player’s later twenties.  While players in other quintiles do not improve 
as rapidly or as much, nearly all players display a steady decline of ability throughout 
their early-to-mid thirties, with the rate of deterioration increasing for those players still 
playing in their later thirties.  The pattern for pitchers during the early stages of careers is 
not clear, but their deterioration during their thirties is still apparent.
24   
 
The expected changes in OPS ( s p doˆ ) for the player’s age group and ability level reported 
in Table 9 serve as the basis of comparison as we attempt to measure under- or over-
performance.  Subtracting the expected change in OPS from the observed change, the 
resulting difference-in-differences would be zero if a hitter or pitcher matches 
expectations, but will take on a negative (positive) value of the hitter (pitcher) 
underperforms. 
 
t t t t s p do ops ops ddops ˆ 1   (1) 
 
To see whether performance drops unexpectedly when a player is not under the pressure 
of (or, put another way, facing the accountability of) a contract year, we have constructed 
a series of variables indicators indicating the years left in a player’s contract during the 
season in question.  The omitted group (ylc1) represents a player in his final year of a 
contract.  As this situation is true of all one-year and contracts, this group contains the 
                                                 
23 See Hakes and Turner (2008).   
 
24 It is possible that the muddled effects during the early stages of a pitcher’s career are due to changes in 
the pitcher’s role on a team.  If a player is introduced to MLB by being placed in favorable situations (relief 
pitching appearances when the pitcher is brought in to exploit platoon/handedness differentials), and in 
subsequent seasons must adapt to starting pitching against a lineup designed to exploit his own weaknesses, 
the improvement in the pitcher’s OPS allowed would be forced downward, and perhaps even show a 
deterioration.  Fewer position players are used specifically to exploit platoon advantages.  
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majority of the observations.  The remaining three groups, ylc2, ylc3, and ylc4, indicate 
that a player has one, two-or-three, and four-or-more guaranteed years left following the 
current season. 
 
If there is truth to the shirking hypothesis, we would expect to see negative values for 
ddops for each of the three indicator variables in a simple ANOVA regression.  Table 10 
shows the results of that analysis, and we see some evidence that this is the case.  In 
Panel A of Table 10, the deviations of player OPS values from expectations increase as 
the period remaining until the player’s next contract increases, and the deviations are 
statistically significant for players with at least two seasons remaining until their next 
negotiations.  The results for pitchers are less clear.  While the point estimates for ddops 
in Panel B of Table 10 are positive, as we would expect, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are not particularly large, and the coefficient is only statistically significant 
for the group of pitchers with two-or-three years remaining until their next negotiation.  
Taken as a group, however, the indicators for remaining time on contract are statistically 




Further exploration of this hypothesis is shown in Table 11, which displays cross-
tabulations of the ddops statistic by the length of the contract signed, and the remaining 
years on that contract.  Looking first at the results for batters in Panel A, we see that 
batters in their first year of a two-year contract tend to under-perform in OPS by 0.0265 
points, which is more than half of one standard deviation of OPS (about ten standard 
errors, given the sample size), while relative performance in the contract year (0.0112) 
does not significantly differ from zero.  For position players under 3-year and 4-year 
contracts, the means show that players systematically underperform until they reach the 
penultimate year of the contract.
26  Players under the longest contracts, 5-or-more years, 
fail to reach expectations until the final three years of their contract, and thereafter match 
their typical level of play.   
 
Similar patterns are shown for among pitchers in Panel B of Table 11.  Pitchers 
systematically underperform in the first year of a two-year contract, then significantly 
improve during the second, contract, year.  Pitchers with 3-year and 4-year contracts 
underperform by 0.0198 in OPS until the final two years of the contract, when they return 
to their expected levels.  Pitchers under 5-year or longer contracts also play below 
                                                 
25 Rather than subtracting the expected performance differential (based on age group and performance 
quintile) from the players actual differential to create the dependent variable above, we also estimated a 
model where the player’s actual performance was the dependent variable and included the player’s 
expected performance differential as an independent variable (along with the categorical variables above).  
The coefficient on expected performance was not statistically different from 1, and the coefficients on the 
categorical variables were nearly identical.   
 
26 Interestingly, players under 3-year and 4-year contracts actually play somewhat above expectations 
during the season just before their contract year.  In subsequent analysis, we will see if there is evidence of 
a significant number of contract extensions being signed by players at this stage of a long-term contract. 
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expectations early on in their contracts, and recover in the final seasons.  These patterns 
are consistent with the shirking hypothesis. 
 
IV. B.  Contracts by Performance Quintile 
 
Given that players under long-term contracts are subject to a lower level of accountability 
from their employers, teams will attempt to limit the issue of those contracts and allow 
them only to the players with the greatest negotiating positions, especially the top-quality 
players on the team.  To demonstrate the extent of this selection effect, Table 12a reports 
the number of contracts of each length by player ability quintile, and Table 12b repeats 
the process for quintiles of pitchers.  As one would expect, the distribution of contracts 
skews towards longer deals as ability increases, so that position players in the top quintile 
of ability (q5) are more than four times as likely to obtain a multi-year contract (two-
years or more) as a marginal player in quintile 1, and the elite players are more than ten 
times likelier to get a contract of five years or longer.  The pattern for pitchers is not as 
pronounced as for position players.  Teams are very stingy with five-year or longer 
contracts with pitchers, awarding them in less than one percent of signed deals even with 
the most elite pitchers.  The pattern is contained mostly to 2-to-4 year deals, with the best 
pitchers signing multi-year deals at a rate about 5.7 times more often than marginal 
pitchers.  Even here, however, the likelihood of a multi-year deal increases with player 
ability slower than with position players, and there appears to be a discrete jump in multi-
year contract likelihood between the bottom two quintiles. 
 
Long-term contracts in MLB came into existence along with free agency more than three 
decades ago.  The free agency period has witnessed a great deal of labor strife, as the 
relative shift of negotiating power towards players was challenged by owners.  In 
addition to repeated brinkmanship during negotiations of each collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) since before free agency began, Commissioner Peter Ueberroth 
organized team owners to restrain themselves from competing for player contracts during 
the 1986 and 1987 seasons.
27  Evidence of owner collusion can be seen in Table 13, 
which displays the proportions of position players and pitchers playing under long term 
contracts by ability quintile and CBA era.  While the proportions for the 1981-85 era are 
likely overstated due to selection effects among contracts signed prior to 1985, it is clear 
that multi-year contracts were much less common for players of all ability levels during 
the 1986-1989 period compared to any other time period within our sample. 
 
IV. C.  Probit Regression Models 
 
The cross-tabulation results previously shown are helpful in establishing partial 
correlations between multi-year contracts and these factors, but they do not allow for 
determining the relative importance of these correlates. We have used probit and ordered 
                                                 
27 Owner collusion has been alleged on many other occassions as well, either with respect to the free agent 
market in general, or with respect to individual players (such as defectors to the Mexican League during the 
1950s, or with Barry Bonds during the 2008 season).  For this paper, we limit ourselves to commenting on 
Collusions I and II, which were litigated formally, and had legal damages awarded by the court system 
against players demonstrated to have been harmed by the collusion.  
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probit regressions to determine which of these factors have a statistically significant 
effect upon predicting a multi-year contract after controlling for all other factors. 
 
While we have recorded many “1+1” contracts, with one guaranteed year followed by a 
(usually, team) option for a second season, the aspect of the contracts we are trying to 
capture here is a team’s willingness to make a commitment to a contract that extends well 
into the future.  For the purposes of the following analysis, therefore, we define a multi-
year contract as a contract of two or more years.   
 
The likely predictors of a player signing a multi-year contact that we have discussed 
earlier are the player’s age, productivity, defensive position, and the negotiating context 
established under the active collective bargaining agreement.    
 
The youngest players, who are within the first six years of their Major League service, 
are still constrained to negotiate with their current team.  This lack of freedom to contract 
will reduce their potential to secure a long-term agreement.  The oldest players are at a 
point in their careers where a decline in productivity is expected, and teams will be 
reluctant to risk a long-term commitment with them.  Using the group of players near 
their production peak, at ages 26-29, as a basis of comparison, we therefore expect 
younger players to be much less likely to obtain multiyear contracts.  Players slightly 
older than the reference group should have a higher probability of a multiyear contract 
due to the onset of free agency, but the likelihood of multiyear contracts should thereafter 
fall with age.   
 
The probit results in Table 14 show that this is indeed the case.  In Model 1 of Table 14, 
where the probit coefficients have been converted into marginal effects, players in the 23-
and-under and 24-25 year-old age groups are both 7.1 to 7.7 percent less likely to obtain a 
multi-year contract.  In Model 3, which is constrained to contracts for pitchers, the point 
estimates are slightly lower but still statistically significant, indicating multi-year deals 
are 4.9 to 5.4 percent less likely for young pitchers.  Models 2 and Model 4 of Table 14 
demonstrate that this is due to negotiating constraints, as limiting the sample to free 
agents removes these negative effects.   
 
Compared to position players, advanced age has a somewhat less pronounced effect upon 
pitchers’ prospects for multi-year contracts.  Model 2 also shows that, compared with 26-
29 year-olds, 34-37 year-old position players are about 3.8 percent less likely to sign a 
multi-year contract, other things equal, while players age 38 or older are about 18 percent 
less likely to obtain a multi-year deal.  The corresponding coefficients for pitchers’ 
contracts reveals that the probability of a long contract, compared to the rate for 26-29 
year-olds, is not significantly lower for 34-37 year-old pitchers, and about 11.3 percent 
lower for pitchers age 38 or older. 
 
Player quality affects the likelihood of a long-term contract in the expected manner.  
Among contracts signed by six-year or more veterans in Model 2, we see that the gap 
between ability quintiles ranges between 5.7 and 11.5 percentage points, so that a 
member of the elite group of players is 19.8 percent more likely to sign a multi-year deal  
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than a player in the median quintile, and players of median ability are 14.0 percent more 
likely to get a multi-year deal than a marginal player.  The pattern is slightly different for 
pitchers, where the largest distinction is between the bottom quintile of pitchers and the 
rest, while the multi-year deal probabilities for the top four quintiles are separated by less 
than 11 percentage points. 
 
The omitted categorical variable for defensive position is first base.  Although Models 1 
and 2 of Table 14 show insignificant differences between most positions, in both models 
it is clear that shortstops are the most likely recipients of a multi-year contract, other 
things equal, and are likely to sign longer deals by about 7.1 to 9.0 percentage points.  
Among pitchers, lefties are more likely to be recipients of a multi-year deal than righties, 
other things equal.  In general, starting pitchers and closers are 22 percent and 21 percent 
more likely to obtain multi-year contracts, respectively, than middle relievers.  After 
taking role and other variables into account, however, the probabilities for multi-year 
deals for lefties are higher by 27, 10, and 12 percent for closers, middle relievers, and 
starters, respectively. 
 
Our set of categorical variables for collective bargaining regimes clearly shows the 
effects of owner collusion on contracts during the CBA in effect during the 1986 to 1989 
signing period, while Peter Ueberroth was commissioner.  Signing rates of multi-year 
contracts for all position players were at least 6.1 percentage points below the rates in any 
other CBA regime, and at least 9.2 percentage points below any other regime among 
contracts for veteran position players.  While the number of contracts signed under the 
newest CBA, which affects only 2007 signings, is still low, the results show far indicate 
that multi-year deals are being signed at an unprecedented rate.
28  
 
IV. D.  Ordered Probit Regressions 
 
While the results of the preceding probit models help demonstrate which factors most 
strongly correlate with the likelihood of a multi-year contract, the use of a dichotomous 
indicator obscures some of the information that would otherwise be revealed by the 
length of those multi-year contracts.  There is a great deal of difference between a two-
year and a six-year contract, and to pool all multi-year deals into one category leads to 
concern over the possibility of biased estimators.  To verify the robustness of our results, 
Table 15 replicates the analysis in Table 14 using the ordered probit regression technique.   
 
In this instance, the dependent variable dlc contains an ordered series of five categories, 
where category 1 is a one year contact, 2 is a one-plus-one contract (that is, one 
guaranteed year plus a one-year option that is usually at the team’s discretion), 3 is a two-
year contract, 4 is a three-year or four-year contract, and 5 is a contract for five or more 
years.  The latter categories pooled multiple contract lengths because the scarcity of 
contracts this long threatened to leave us with too few degrees of freedom to identify the 
coefficients otherwise. 
                                                 
28 Information on contracts signed before 1986 are omitted, as the contracts we have are subject to selection 
bias.  See footnote 20.   
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As the results in Table 15 show, the ordered probit models mostly echo the results of the 
original probit model.  The coefficients shown are probit coefficients, which represent the 
change in the fitted Z-score for the latent variable.  The age group patterns are replicated, 
as are the effects of ability quintile and the CBA regime.  There are still no positive and 
significant effects from the debut of a new ballpark.  Among defensive positions, 
shortstops are still more likely to obtain a long-term contract, and in these models we see 
that catchers also have positive coefficients in both Model 1 and Model 2, although the 
effects are not statistically significant, with p-values just above the 10% significance 
level.   
 
One additional bit of information is given by the relative magnitude of the cut-points.  
Even the first cut point is at 1.6 standard errors in Model 2 or Table 15, while the gaps 
between the first and the two following cut points are relatively smaller.  This reveals that 
once a player has the characteristics deemed worthy of a multi-year deal, there is very 
little empirical evidence to distinguish between a one-plus-one contract and a two-year 
guaranteed contract, or even a 3-4 year deal.  By contrast, the gap between the cut points 
predicting between 3-4 year deals and a 5+ year deal is relatively quite large, at about 0.8 
standard deviations for position players, and an even larger 1.2 standard deviations for 
pitchers.  The exclusion of 5-plus-year deals to a very select minority of players, and 
even fewer pitchers, is evidence of a possible allowance for greater forecasting error of 
pitcher productivity due to injury risk or potential loss of effectiveness. 
 
V. A.  Salary Regressions 
 
The patterns displayed in Tables 14 and 15 are consistent with our expectations of how 
the likelihood of multi-year contracts would change with respect to age, ability, defensive 
position, and bargaining context.  The market equilibrium in contract negotiations for 
long-terms deals, however, must consider both deal length and salary considerations.  To 
obtain a complete picture of how multi-year deals affect the MLB labor market, we must 
also look at the effects of these deals upon player salaries. 
 
As discussed previously, one might hypothesize any of several patterns distinctive to 
multi-year deals.  From the player’s perspective, the advantage of a longer contract is that 
the guaranteed pay is a type of insurance against injury or declining ability that he is 
buying from his employers.  Normally, insurance of that type is associated with a risk 
premium, which would show up in salary levels, other things equal, as a decrease in 
salary in return for a longer contract.  As we will show in the upcoming results in Table 
16, however, longer contracts are associated with higher salaries rather than lower ones, 
so this hypothesis is rejected by the data, a finding similar to Kahn (1993).   
 
Teams, of course, are free to choose which players to whom they may offer longer 
contracts.  As maximizing agents, we would expect teams to prefer to offer multi-year 
deals to players who would be difficult to replace in the annual labor market, those with 
exceptional productivity, and particularly those at defensive positions requiring 
extraordinary dexterity and skill (as we saw with the shortstop indicator in Tables 14 and  
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15).  As a result of this selection, which might also include considerations of the 
individual player’s likelihood of shirking, the team might decide that the player’s 
valuable services for a prolonged period are worth the risk of potential injury, decline, or 
shirking.  It would become unclear, however, whether the net benefit after these 
calculations would predict a salary premium to the player or a discount.  This would 
become an empirical issue.  In this extreme tail of the distribution, there is the additional 
question of whether the returns to ability among these elite players are linear, or even log-
linear.  
 
One final hypothesis regarding salary returns to long-deals comes from game theory.  
That hypothesis is that the frenzied rhythms of bids, offers, and counter-offers – often 
among several teams – for a unique player’s services can result in systematic overbidding 
for the contracts of the elite players.  This “winner’s curse” is one possible mechanism 
that would lead to the non-linear returns to ability discussed in the previous paragraph.
29  
In a scenario where the winner’s curse results in very large, very long contracts to the 
best players, we would expect that this correlation would result in large positive 
coefficients on indicators of long contracts, with the coefficients increasing exponentially 
in contract length. 
 
To examine the effects of multi-year deals upon player salaries, Table 16 shows the 
estimates for four models, one pair pertaining to position players and the other pair to 
pitchers.  Models 1 and 3 are designed along the lines of the second stage of a Scully 
regression, and predict logged salary (that is, ln(salary) ) as a function of player ability, 
defensive position, age, freedom to negotiate, and the player’s context in terms of 
whether he is on a high- or low-payroll team or on a team either playing in or about to 
move into a new ballpark.  A set of indicator variables for each season is included to 
control for salary inflation over the years, and other market-wide effects such as the 
1994-95 player strike, the collusion era of 1986-87, changes in media contracts, etc.   
 
The coefficients in Models 1 and 3 of Table 16 match the results found by other 
researchers, and establish the basis of comparison for our multi-year contracts addition.  
Increased ability to negotiate contracts through arbitration eligibility or free agency 
increases log-salaries substantially, with expected salary increases of 116 percent and 442 
percent over the salaries of otherwise similar players still under the reserve clause.
30   
 
The returns to current productivity for position players are such that a one standard 
deviation increase in OPS (about 0.155) leads to an expected 20 percent increase in 
salary.  The OPS quintiles control for the player’s quality cohort, so as to pick up non-
(log)linear effects in the labor market, and show that there are increasing salary premiums 
paid to higher ability cohorts.  The positional indicators show salary premiums to middle 
infielders and designated hitters, and lower salaries for catchers and third basemen, 
relative to outfielders.  The well-documented pattern of rising salaries for younger 
                                                 
29 See Burger and Walters (2003). 
 
30 These and subsequent percentage point expected salary increases are obtained with the formula 
100*(exp(β)-1).  
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players and falling salaries for older players is evident, and the control variables for 
large- and small-payroll teams have the expected signs.  One minor surprise is that 
salaries appear to be slightly depressed (about 17 percent lower) in the two years prior to 
the debut of an employer’s new ballpark. 
 
The coefficients determining pitcher’s salaries in the basis-of-comparison Model 3 of 
Table 16 are quite similar.  The expected returns to arbitration eligibility and free agency 
are somewhat smaller than for position players (about 99 percent and 320 percent, 
respectively), but are much less sensitive to OPS allowed.  A one standard deviation 
decrease in OPS allowed to opposing hitters only results in an expected 3.6 percent salary 
increase.  Similarly, the relative standing effects of the ability quintiles are much smaller.  
While the effects of being on a high- or low-payroll team are similar to those for position 
players, there are no significant effects of playing on a team either in a new ballpark, or 
about to move into a new park.  The positional differences between pitchers’ roles is a 
significant determinant of salary, however, with starters (either right- or left-handed) 
typically earning 120 percent more than middle relief pitchers, right-handed closers 
earning on average about 70 percent more than middle relievers, and lefty closers being 
paid about 92 percent more than middle relievers.  The adjusted R-squared measure for 
goodness of fit for the model is about 0.67 for position players and about 0.70 for 
pitchers, which is about average for a model of this type. 
 
Models 2 and 4 of Table 16 introduce sets of indicator variables to add information on 
contract structure.  The variable dlc is short for deal-length category, and is divided into 
five levels.  The first level is for one-year deals, and the second level is for one-plus-one 
contracts.  The subsequent levels (3, 4, and 5) represent two-year deals, three-and four-
year deals, and five-or-more-year contracts, respectively.  To capture the possibility that 
contracts signed one-or-more years before the current season might be systematically 
larger or smaller than recently-signed contracts, a group of indicators called yrsincat is 
included.  The omitted level of yrsincat is for contracts in their first year, which will 
include all one-year contracts and freshly-signed multi-year deals.  The other categories 
of yrsincat are for the second year of a contract, for the third and fourth years, and for 
being in the fifth or later year of a contract. 
 
Given the obvious relationship between the sets of indicators, the interpretation is subtle.  
For example, consider a two-year guaranteed contract using the coefficients reported in 
Model 2 of Table 16.  Compared to the salaries under a pair of one-year deals with other 
considerations equal (that is, the player remains in the same age group, and the contract 
does not affect his performance), the player will receive a premium of about 66 percent 
(coef. = 0.509) on his salary during the first year of the deal.  During the second year, 
however, the effect will be a salary will still be positive, this time about 19 percent higher 
than he might have otherwise expected (coef. = 0.509 -0.338 = 0.171).  For all multi-year 
deals here, the pattern is a high premium in the first year of a contract, with the premium 
declining (but not disappearing) through the subsequent years.  
 
Returns to pitchers of long-term contracts follow a somewhat similar pattern in most 
instances.  For a hypothetical two-year contract to a pitcher, the first year offers a  
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premium of 85 percent (coef. = 0.617), while the second year premium is a still 
significant 54 percent (coef. = 0.617 – 0.183 = 0.434).  The largest difference is for the 
longest contracts, those extending at least 5 seasons.  The coefficient for the longest 
yrsincat indicator (-1.367) is larger than the magnitude of the deal length coefficient 
(1.214), meaning that in the final year(s) of a five-plus year long pitcher’s contract, the 
pitcher is earning less than he would have with similar production under shorter deals.  
That is, the pitcher is taking a salary decrease of approximately 14 percent in order to 
obtain the longer deal.  The reluctance of teams to sign long deals with even the most 
elite pitchers without commanding this salary concession reflects the additional risk 
pitchers pose of injury or ability decline over time.  So even though the hypothesis is 
rejected that productivity risk premiums dominate the salary differentials in longer 
contracts, there is evidence that risk is being considered, although perhaps not as the 
primary factor. 
 
V. B. Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regressions 
 
As Krautmann and Oppenheimer (2002) noted, to correctly estimate a system involving 
simultaneity between endogenous variables, it is necessary to identify the structure of the 
system of equations and one or more instrumental variables so that the system is 
identified.  In this instance the two “goods” being allocated are contract length and dollar 
value per season (expressed as ln(salary)), with the player’s utility increasing in both 
goods and the team’s value function decreasing as dispersement of those goods increases.   
 
We will construct the system so that the player objective is to increase contract length as 
a function of salary and his risk of a performance decline.  Although that risk of 
performance decline certainly contains an unobservable component known privately to 
the player, we can proxy for some of this risk through variables that are actuarially 
correlated to performance declines, specifically aging and defensive position. 
 
  deallengthi = f( ln(salary)i , age groupi, positioni )        (2) 
 
The second equation in the system is constructed from the team’s perspective as they 
consider the player’s expected marginal revenue product, which will depend upon both 
expected production and expected market conditions as they attempt to sell tickets and 
concessions, lease luxury boxes and obtain other revenue streams from media rights, 
naming rights, merchandising, and so on.  More specifically, their willingness to pay for a 
particular player each season will be a function of the contract length, player ability and 
current production, defensive prowess (proxied by defensive position or pitching role), 
the player’s ability to freely negotiate salary, the team’s market size (here measured by 
payroll level rather than population, although this is subject to change in later drafts), and 
the potential extra revenue that might be generated through performing at a new stadium, 
or willingness-to-pay players to promote fan interest in a stadium about to open. 
 
ln(salary)i = f( deal lengthi, OPSi, ability groupi, positioni, free agent/arbit, new 
stadium open/soon, high/ low team payroll      (3) 
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There are several exogenous variables in equation (3) that identify salary in equation (2), 
and the age group variables in equation (2) identify deal length in equation (3).  In future 
drafts, we hope to have information on player injury histories, which might be a better 
instrument for risk of production declines, and this would allow us to include age group 
in equation (3) as a predictor of MRP. 
 
When the model is estimated, the results largely follow those of the OLS results above.  
The returns to OPS_against for pitchers are realized with more error than returns to OPS 
for batters, which may be due to systematic bias in the OPS measure based upon the 
situations in which a pitcher is used (such as left-handed pitchers brought in for one 
batter to exploit platoon advantages against left-handed batters).  Among the positional 
estimates, the 2SLS model indicates that second basemen and designated hitters receive 
shorter but more lucrative contracts, other things equal, than the baseline group of 
outfielders.  Catchers, however, tend to receive slightly longer contracts, albeit for 
smaller dollar values, perhaps reflecting the insurance value to the team of having a 
reserve catcher (the defensive position with the rarest skill set) available, even if he is not 
on the field generating production statistics. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Much work remains to be done.  In addition to confirming the terms of the remaining 
missing contracts, we seek to collect information on player injuries (both disabled list 
(DL) stints and off-season/late season injuries and surgeries that do not result in a trip to 
the DL) and on more precise signing dates, so that we might explore how teams manage 
their rosters and compete for talent within the annual baseball player job market.  More 
important for the quality of our research here, we wish to obtain player injury data to 
improve the instrumention in the two-stage least squares regression model.   
 
With those caveats in mind, we have made some progress. Through use of a large data set 
of Major League Baseball player contracts from 1985 to 2007, we have addressed several 
topics of interest to economists.  We add confirming evidence to earlier models of the 
effects of monopsony and bargaining constraints upon labor markets, and are able to find 
empirical support for the hypothesis that player performance systematically varies during 
longer contracts in a manner suggestive of shirking.  Probit and ordered probit models 
show that position players are more likely to obtain long-term contracts than pitchers and 
that higher-ability players obtain longer deals.  Both of these findings are consistent with 
models of risk management.  Finally, (subject to confirmation with a model correcting for 
simultaneity) we show that inclusion of information regarding a player’s contract status -- 
referring to both the length of the contract and its remaining duration – significantly 
increases the explanatory power of log-salaries in pay-and-performance models, and 
shows that while pitchers must pay an implicit risk premium for a contract extending five 
years or more, the best position players are rewarded with contracts that are both more 
lucrative and longer. 
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Table 1: Deal length 
Deal Length  Batters  Pitchers 
1  6,965  6,316 
1 + 1  98  81 
2  397  327 
3  262  207 
4  146  101 
5  88  24 
6  20  5 
7  8  2 
8  3  1 
9  2  -- 
10  3  -- 
Total  7,992  7,064 
Note: Row labeled 1 + 1 refers to players with one year contract with a one-year option.  
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Table 2a:  Summary statistics by deal status, batters 
variable  mid deal  1  1 + 1  2  3 - 4  5+  All 
age  31.35  27.84  32.76  31.57  29.15  28.71  28.79 
age23u  0.006  0.113  0.000  0.003  0.054  0.056  0.083 
age2425  0.032  0.197  0.010  0.020  0.076  0.137  0.150 
age2629  0.245  0.406  0.184  0.254  0.414  0.419  0.366 
age3033  0.471  0.180  0.367  0.438  0.365  0.298  0.259 
age3437  0.211  0.079  0.357  0.259  0.086  0.089  0.115 
age38up  0.035  0.025  0.082  0.025  0.005  0.000  0.027 
debutyear  1988.5  1990.7  1990.4  1988.4  1989.3  1988.4  1990.5 
dealyr  1996.0  1995.7  2000.6  1997.2  1996.2  1995.0  1995.8 
deallength  3.424  1.000  1.000  2.000  3.358  5.548  1.241 
yrsin  2.890  1.000  1.000  1.050  1.167  1.766  1.023 
yrsleft  0.9276  0.0000  0.0000  0.9496  2.1912  3.7823  0.2177 
obp  0.346  0.314  0.332  0.329  0.345  0.358  0.323 
slg  0.437  0.376  0.417  0.393  0.434  0.478  0.392 
ops  0.783  0.689  0.749  0.722  0.779  0.836  0.715 
rc27  4.177  3.312  3.818  3.558  4.098  4.707  3.547 
rc  68.35  37.43  49.45  49.12  72.98  89.43  46.22 
exp  9.384  4.952  10.102  8.801  7.002  7.387  6.144 
salary  4485235  640530  2035029  1710394  2903889  4563755  1596100 
isal  2.573  0.531  1.018  1.182  2.047  3.054  1.058 
lnsal  14.93  12.76  14.11  14.00  14.50  14.77  13.34 
lnisal  0.723  -1.209  -0.328  -0.112  0.456  0.803  -0.682 
teamsalhi  0.304  0.183  0.204  0.196  0.250  0.315  0.212 
teamsallo  0.108  0.250  0.184  0.179  0.162  0.089  0.213 
q1  0.0690  0.2561  0.0612  0.1505  0.0792  0.0732  0.2353 
q2  0.1181  0.2292  0.2245  0.2041  0.1460  0.0976  0.2211 
q3  0.1662  0.2090  0.2245  0.2423  0.1955  0.1057  0.2085 
q4  0.2607  0.1747  0.2245  0.2398  0.2723  0.2358  0.1851 
q5  0.3860  0.1311  0.2653  0.1633  0.3069  0.4878  0.1499 
dlc  4.0321  1.0000  2.0000  3.0000  4.0000  5.0000  1.3268 
dops  -0.0080  -0.0039  0.0023  -0.0369  -0.0187  -0.0279  -0.0079 
ddops  0.0009  -0.0002  0.0164  -0.0267  -0.0153  -0.0261  -0.0024 
ylc1  0.4719  1.0000  1.0000  0.0320  0.0262  0.0420  0.7318 
ylc2  0.2705  0.0000  0.0000  0.9680  0.0367  0.0672  0.1276 
ylc3  0.2132  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.9370  0.1513  0.1151 
ylc4  0.0443  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.7395  0.0255 
               
n  1961  6965  98  397  408  124  9953 
Note:  Statistics in the first column (mid deal) refer to player-seasons in which the player 
has not entered into a new contract.  All other columns refer to information for the 
player-season in which the player has entered into a contract.        
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Table 2b:  Summary statistics by deal status, pitchers 
  mid deal  1  1 + 1  2  3 - 4  5+  All 
age  31.87  27.64  33.16  31.44  29.94  29.19  28.55 
age23u  0.008  0.124  0.012  0.012  0.032  0.063  0.098 
age2425  0.024  0.207  0.012  0.034  0.075  0.000  0.166 
age2629  0.223  0.405  0.136  0.281  0.338  0.531  0.368 
age3033  0.427  0.175  0.420  0.394  0.425  0.344  0.233 
age3437  0.251  0.065  0.222  0.220  0.114  0.063  0.102 
age38up  0.067  0.025  0.198  0.058  0.016  0.000  0.033 
debutyear  1989.2  1991.8  1989.8  1989.9  1990.0  1987.6  1991.6 
dealyr  1997.0  1996.2  2000.0  1998.3  1997.4  1994.8  1996.4 
deallength  2.836  1.000  1.000  2.000  3.328  5.375  1.168 
yrsin  2.616  1.000  1.000  1.031  1.133  1.594  1.010 
yrsleft  0.6302  0.0000  0.0000  0.9694  2.1948  3.7813  0.1577 
era  4.263  4.858  4.390  4.425  4.080  3.890  4.716 
whip  1.373  1.504  1.385  1.406  1.368  1.306  1.474 
obp_a  0.328  0.345  0.330  0.332  0.325  0.318  0.341 
slg_a  0.412  0.424  0.416  0.416  0.403  0.386  0.421 
ops_a  0.739  0.770  0.746  0.748  0.728  0.704  0.762 
rc27_a  3.735  4.060  3.763  3.814  3.587  3.357  3.979 
k9  6.681  6.263  6.610  6.513  6.872  6.711  6.362 
exp  9.414  4.402  10.272  8.431  7.451  7.781  5.482 
salary  4094559  668495  2121285  2102118  3175973  4488289  1350844 
isal  2.303  0.517  1.106  1.296  2.097  3.028  0.885 
lnsal  14.91  12.77  14.13  14.25  14.64  14.82  13.23 
lnisal  0.632  -1.258  -0.261  0.026  0.488  0.931  -0.847 
teamsalhi  0.326  0.174  0.235  0.229  0.338  0.313  0.206 
teamsallo  0.102  0.250  0.111  0.159  0.091  0.063  0.217 
q1  0.0411  0.2486  0.0864  0.0734  0.0521  0.0313  0.2282 
q2  0.1571  0.2103  0.1481  0.1774  0.2085  0.2500  0.2081 
q3  0.2179  0.1956  0.1235  0.2049  0.2280  0.2188  0.1968 
q4  0.2664  0.1793  0.3086  0.2538  0.2443  0.2813  0.1879 
q5  0.3174  0.1662  0.3333  0.2905  0.2671  0.2188  0.1790 
dlc  3.775  1.000  2.000  3.000  4.000  5.000  1.253 
dops_a  0.0041  0.0017  0.0059  0.0250  0.0275  0.0159  0.0164 
ddops_a  0.5732  1.0000  1.0000  0.0235  0.0140  0.0345  0.0048 
ylc1  0.2767  0.0000  0.0000  0.9765  0.0281  0.0690  0.8126 
ylc2  0.1338  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.9579  0.1724  0.1061 
ylc3  0.0163  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.7241  0.0745 
ylc4  3.776  1.000  2.000  3.000  4.000  5.000  0.0068 
               
n  1217  6316  81  327  308  32  8281 
Note:  Statistics in the first column (mid deal) refer to player-seasons in which the player 
has not entered into a new contract.  All other columns refer to information for the 
player-season in which the player has entered into a contract.        
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Table 3a:  Contracts, by deal length and age group, batters 
  1  1 + 1  2  3 - 4  5+  All 
<23  785  0  1  22  7  815 
24-25  1,374  1  8  31  17  1,431 
26-29  2,826  18  101  169  52  3,166 
30-33  1,254  36  174  149  37  1,650 
34-37  551  35  103  35  11  735 
38&up  175  8  10  2  0  195 
Total  6,965  98  397  408  124  7,992 
 
Row percentages: 
  1  1 + 1  2  3 - 4  5+  All 
<23  96.32  0.00  0.12  2.70  0.86  100.00 
24-25  96.02  0.07  0.56  2.17  1.19  100.00 
26-29  89.26  0.57  3.19  5.34  1.64  100.00 
30-33  76.00  2.18  10.55  9.03  2.24  100.00 
34-37  74.97  4.76  14.01  4.76  1.50  100.00 
38&up  89.74  4.10  5.13  1.03  0.00  100.00 
Total  87.15  1.23  4.97  5.11  1.55  100.00 
 
Column percentages: 
  1  1 + 1  2  3 - 4  5+  All 
<23  11.27  0.00  0.25  5.39  5.65  10.20 
24-25  19.73  1.02  2.02  7.60  13.71  17.91 
26-29  40.57  18.37  25.44  41.42  41.94  39.61 
30-33  18.00  36.73  43.83  36.52  29.84  20.65 
34-37  7.91  35.71  25.94  8.58  8.87  9.20 
38&up  2.51  8.16  2.52  0.49  0.00  2.44 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of independence between deal length and age group is rejected 
at the 1% significance level (
2=636.9, p = 0.000).  
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Table 3b:  Contracts, by deal length and age group, pitchers 
  1  1 + 1  2  3 - 4  5+  All 
<23  781  1  4  10  2  798 
24-25  1,307  1  11  23  0  1,342 
26-29  2,556  11  92  104  17  2,780 
30-33  1,105  34  129  131  11  1,410 
34-37  411  18  72  35  2  538 
38&up  156  16  19  5  0  196 
Total  6,316  81  327  308  32  7,064 
 
Row percentages: 
  1  1 + 1  2  3 - 4  5+  All 
<23  97.87  0.13  0.50  1.25  0.25  100.00 
24-25  97.39  0.07  0.82  1.71  0.00  100.00 
26-29  91.94  0.40  3.31  3.74  0.61  100.00 
30-33  78.37  2.41  9.15  9.29  0.78  100.00 
34-37  76.39  3.35  13.38  6.51  0.37  100.00 
38&up  79.59  8.16  9.69  2.55  0.00  100.00 
Total  89.41  1.15  4.63  4.36  0.45  100.00 
 
Column percentages: 
  1  1 + 1  2  3 - 4  5+  All 
<23  12.37  1.23  1.22  3.25  6.25  11.30 
24-25  20.69  1.23  3.36  7.47  0.00  19.00 
26-29  40.47  13.58  28.13  33.77  53.13  39.35 
30-33  17.50  41.98  39.45  42.53  34.38  19.96 
34-37  6.51  22.22  22.02  11.36  6.25  7.62 
38&up  2.47  19.75  5.81  1.62  0.00  2.77 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of independence between deal length and age group is rejected 
at the 1% significance level (
2=594.5, p = 0.000).  
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Table 4a: Contracts, by deal length and defensive position, batters 
  1  1 + 1  2  3 - 4  5+  All 
1B  771  13  63  51  20  918 
2B  824  14  41  44  8  931 
3B  815  10  41  52  14  932 
C  1,148  19  77  52  10  1,306 
DH  54  2  3  4  0  63 
OF  2,616  31  141  156  57  3,001 
SS  737  9  31  49  15  841 
Total  6,965  98  397  408  124  7,992 
 
Row percentages: 
  1  1 + 1  2  3 - 4  5+  All 
1B  83.99  1.42  6.86  5.56  2.18  100.00 
2B  88.51  1.50  4.40  4.73  0.86  100.00 
3B  87.45  1.07  4.40  5.58  1.50  100.00 
C  87.90  1.45  5.90  3.98  0.77  100.00 
DH  85.71  3.17  4.76  6.35  0.00  100.00 
OF  87.17  1.03  4.70  5.20  1.90  100.00 
SS  87.63  1.07  3.69  5.83  1.78  100.00 
Total  87.15  1.23  4.97  5.11  1.55  100.00 
 
Column percentages 
  1  1 + 1  2  3 - 4  5+  All 
1B  11.07  13.27  15.87  12.50  16.13  11.49 
2B  11.83  14.29  10.33  10.78  6.45  11.65 
3B  11.70  10.20  10.33  12.75  11.29  11.66 
C  16.48  19.39  19.40  12.75  8.06  16.34 
DH  0.78  2.04  0.76  0.98  0.00  0.79 
OF  37.56  31.63  35.52  38.24  45.97  37.55 
SS  10.58  9.18  7.81  12.01  12.10  10.52 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of independence between deal length and defensive positions is 
rejected at the 5% significance level (
2=38.72, p = 0.029).  
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Table 4b: Contracts, by deal length and defensive position, pitchers 
  1 yr  1+1  2 yr  3-4  5+  Total 
LHC  67  3  11  14  1  96 
LHP  1,087  13  62  24  0  1,186 
LHS  675  7  38  68  9  797 
RHC  557  9  52  41  5  664 
RHP  2,194  22  73  30  0  2,319 
RHS  1,736  27  91  131  17  2,002 
Total  6,316  81  327  308  32  7,064 
 
Row percentages: 
  1 yr  1+1  2 yr  3-4  5+  Total 
LHC  69.79  3.13  11.46  14.58  1.04  100.00 
LHP  91.65  1.10  5.23  2.02  0.00  100.00 
LHS  84.69  0.88  4.77  8.53  1.13  100.00 
RHC  83.89  1.36  7.83  6.17  0.75  100.00 
RHP  94.61  0.95  3.15  1.29  0.00  100.00 
RHS  86.71  1.35  4.55  6.54  0.85  100.00 
Total  89.41  1.15  4.63  4.36  0.45  100.00 
 
Column percentages: 
  1 yr  1+1  2 yr  3-4  5+  Total 
LHC  1.06  3.70  3.36  4.55  3.13  1.36 
LHP  17.21  16.05  18.96  7.79  0.00  16.79 
LHS  10.69  8.64  11.62  22.08  28.13  11.28 
RHC  8.82  11.11  15.90  13.31  15.63  9.40 
RHP  34.74  27.16  22.32  9.74  0.00  32.83 
RHS  27.49  33.33  27.83  42.53  53.13  28.34 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of independence between deal length and defensive positions is 
rejected at the 5% significance level (
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Table 5a: Contracts, by deal length and CBA regime, batters 
  1  1+1  2  3-4  5+  Total 
1981-85  208  1  18  43  37  307 
1986-89  1,253  7  37  28  0  1,325 
1990-94  1,660  6  71  101  15  1,853 
1995-01  2,269  37  164  131  37  2,638 
2002-06  1,335  34  87  83  26  1,565 
2007  240  13  20  22  9  304 
Total  6,965  98  397  408  124  7,992 
 
Row percentages: 
  1  1+1  2  3-4  5+  Total 
1981-85  67.75  0.33  5.86  14.01  12.05  100.00 
1986-89  94.57  0.53  2.79  2.11  0.00  100.00 
1990-94  89.58  0.32  3.83  5.45  0.81  100.00 
1995-01  86.01  1.40  6.22  4.97  1.40  100.00 
2002-06  85.30  2.17  5.56  5.30  1.66  100.00 
2007  78.95  4.28  6.58  7.24  2.96  100.00 
Total  87.15  1.23  4.97  5.11  1.55  100.00 
 
Column percentages: 
  1  1+1  2  3-4  5+  Total 
1981-85  2.99  1.02  4.53  10.54  29.84  3.84 
1986-89  17.99  7.14  9.32  6.86  0.00  16.58 
1990-94  23.83  6.12  17.88  24.75  12.10  23.19 
1995-01  32.58  37.76  41.31  32.11  29.84  33.01 
2002-06  19.17  34.69  21.91  20.34  20.97  19.58 
2007  3.45  13.27  5.04  5.39  7.26  3.80 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of independence between deal length and defensive positions is 
rejected at the 1% significance level (
2=433.8, p = 0.000).  
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Table 5b: Contracts, by deal length and bargaining era, pitchers 
  1  1+1  2  3-4  5+  Total 
1981-85  171  1  9  22  12  215 
1986-89  954  4  29  19  0  1,006 
1990-94  1,430  9  42  63  2  1,546 
1995-01  2,206  28  139  111  9  2,493 
2002-06  1,292  29  93  69  5  1,488 
2007  263  10  15  24  4  316 
Total  6,316  81  327  308  32  7,064 
 
Row percentages: 
  1  1+1  2  3-4  5+  Total 
1981-85  79.53  0.47  4.19  10.23  5.58  100.00 
1986-89  94.83  0.40  2.88  1.89  0.00  100.00 
1990-94  92.50  0.58  2.72  4.08  0.13  100.00 
1995-01  88.49  1.12  5.58  4.45  0.36  100.00 
2002-06  86.83  1.95  6.25  4.64  0.34  100.00 
2007-  83.23  3.16  4.75  7.59  1.27  100.00 
Total  89.41  1.15  4.63  4.36  0.45  100.00 
 
Column percentages: 
  1  1+1  2  3-4  5+  Total 
1981-85  2.71  1.23  2.75  7.14  37.50  3.04 
1986-89  15.10  4.94  8.87  6.17  0.00  14.24 
1990-94  22.64  11.11  12.84  20.45  6.25  21.89 
1995-01  34.93  34.57  42.51  36.04  28.13  35.29 
2002-06  20.46  35.80  28.44  22.40  15.63  21.06 
2007-  4.16  12.35  4.59  7.79  12.50  4.47 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of independence between deal length and defensive positions is 
rejected at the 1% significance level (
2=249.6, p = 0.000).  
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Table 6:  Contracts, by years remaining on contract and team payroll category 
Panel A: Batters 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
Low  1,879  123  100  15  2,117 
Mid  4,618  554  469  87  5,728 
High  1,572  254  216  66  2,108 
Total  8,069  931  785  168  9,953 
 
Row percentages: 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
Low  88.76  5.81  4.72  0.71  100.00 
Mid  80.62  9.67  8.19  1.52  100.00 
High  74.57  12.05  10.25  3.13  100.00 
Total  81.07  9.35  7.89  1.69  100.00 
 
Column percentages: 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
Low  23.29  13.21  12.74  8.93  21.27 
Mid  57.23  59.51  59.75  51.79  57.55 
High  19.48  27.28  27.52  39.29  21.18 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
 
Panel B: Pitchers 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
Low  1,673  84  35  1  1,793 
Mid  4,117  383  258  26  4,784 
High  1,333  194  162  15  1,704 
Total  7,123  661  455  42  8,281 
 
Row percentages: 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
Low  93.31  4.68  1.95  0.06  100.00 
Mid  86.06  8.01  5.39  0.54  100.00 
High  78.23  11.38  9.51  0.88  100.00 
Total  86.02  7.98  5.49  0.51  100.00 
 
Column percentages: 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
Low  23.49  12.71  7.69  2.38  21.65 
Mid  57.80  57.94  56.70  61.90  57.77 
High  18.71  29.35  35.60  35.71  20.58 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of independence between years remaining and salary category 
is rejected at the 1% level for both batters (
2=153.4, p = 0.000) and pitchers (
2=175.2,  
p = 0.000).  Low (high) refers to the 6 teams with lowest (highest) opening day payroll.    
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Table 7a: Contracts, by years remaining on contract and bargaining era, batters 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
1981-85  240  29  38  11  318 
1986-89  1,362  103  73  6  1,544 
1990-94  1,858  183  156  18  2,215 
1995-01  2,676  351  277  47  3,351 
2002-06  1,629  217  194  70  2,110 
2007-  304  48  47  16  415 
Total  8,069  931  785  168  9,953 
 
Row percentages: 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
1981-85  75.47  9.12  11.95  3.46  100.00 
1986-89  88.21  6.67  4.73  0.39  100.00 
1990-94  83.88  8.26  7.04  0.81  100.00 
1995-01  79.86  10.47  8.27  1.40  100.00 
2002-06  77.20  10.28  9.19  3.32  100.00 
2007-  73.25  11.57  11.33  3.86  100.00 
Total  81.07  9.35  7.89  1.69  100.00 
 
Column percentages: 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
1981-85  2.97  3.11  4.84  6.55  3.20 
1986-89  16.88  11.06  9.30  3.57  15.51 
1990-94  23.03  19.66  19.87  10.71  22.25 
1995-01  33.16  37.70  35.29  27.98  33.67 
2002-06  20.19  23.31  24.71  41.67  21.20 
2007-  3.77  5.16  5.99  9.52  4.17 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of independence between years remaining on contract and 
bargaining era is rejected at the 1% significance level (
2=161.4, p = 0.000).    
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Table 7b: Contracts, by years remaining on contract and bargaining era, pitchers 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
1981-85  183  15  17  5  220 
1986-89  1,022  58  35  2  1,117 
1990-94  1,552  113  90  3  1,758 
1995-01  2,489  252  153  13  2,907 
2002-06  1,564  187  121  13  1,885 
2007-  313  36  39  6  394 
Total  7,123  661  455  42  8,281 
 
Row percentages: 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
1981-85  83.18  6.82  7.73  2.27  100.00 
1986-89  91.50  5.19  3.13  0.18  100.00 
1990-94  88.28  6.43  5.12  0.17  100.00 
1995-01  85.62  8.67  5.26  0.45  100.00 
2002-06  82.97  9.92  6.42  0.69  100.00 
2007-  79.44  9.14  9.90  1.52  100.00 
Total  86.02  7.98  5.49  0.51  100.00 
 
Column percentages: 
  0  1  2-3  4+  Total 
1981-85  2.57  2.27  3.74  11.90  2.66 
1986-89  14.35  8.77  7.69  4.76  13.49 
1990-94  21.79  17.10  19.78  7.14  21.23 
1995-01  34.94  38.12  33.63  30.95  35.10 
2002-06  21.96  28.29  26.59  30.95  22.76 
2007-  4.39  5.45  8.57  14.29  4.76 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of independence between years remaining on contract and 
bargaining era is rejected at the 1% significance level (
2=97.22, p = 0.000).  
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Table 8: Fraction of player-season in final year of contract by performance quintile, 
 
Panel A: Batters 
Performance Quintile  Observations  Fraction 
q1  1890  0.922 
q2  1880  0.882 
q3  1880  0.827 
q4  1890  0.750 
q5  1873  0.621 
no quintile  540  0.985 
Total  9953  0.811 
 
Panel B: Pitchers 
Performance Quintile  Observations  Fraction 
1  1591  0.965 
2  1596  0.873 
3  1594  0.837 
4  1593  0.813 
5  1595  0.787 
no quintile  312  0.997 
Total  8281  0.860 
Note:  The criteria used for selecting performance quintiles for batters (pitchers) is based 
on each player’s best season with at least 130 plate appearances (batters faced), as 
measured by OPS (OPS against).   
Players without a qualifying season are not assigned a quintile.  
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Table 9: Average change in OPS (OPS against) by age and performance quintile 
 
Panel A: Batters 
  q1  q2  q3  q4  q5 
<23  -0.0008  -0.0004  0.0117  0.0122  0.0412 
24-25  -0.0019  0.0019  0.0089  0.0107  0.0257 
26-29  -0.0116  -0.0029  -0.0072  0.0036  0.0033 
30-33  -0.0145  -0.0123  -0.0115  -0.0106  -0.0114 
34-37  -0.0148  -0.0119  -0.0267  -0.0115  -0.0193 
38&up  -0.0284  -0.0319  -0.0083  -0.0311  -0.0361 
 
Panel B: Pitchers 
  q1  q2  q3  q4  q5 
<23  0.0245  0.0071  0.0046  -0.0133  0.0018 
24-25  0.0090  0.0124  0.0005  -0.0006  -0.0128 
26-29  0.0183  0.0134  0.0117  0.0084  0.0074 
30-33  0.0241  0.0198  0.0119  0.0150  0.0077 
34-37  0.0236  0.0071  0.0194  0.0178  0.0172 
38&up  0.0121  0.0182  0.0023  0.0183  0.0141 
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Table 10: OLS regressions of unpredictable change in performance  
 
Panel A: Batters 
 
Dependent variable: dops 
Variable  coef.  std. error  t  Prob>t    N  6558 
ylc2  -0.0052  0.0034  -1.53  0.126    F  6.04 
ylc3  -0.0094  0.0033  -2.80  0.005    Prob > F  0.0004 
ylc4  -0.0212  0.0063  -3.35  0.001    R-squared  0.0028 
_cons  0.0013  0.0014  0.90  0.370    Adj. R-squared  0.0023 
Note: observations are weighted by plate appearances.   
 
Panel B: Pitchers 
 
Dependent variable: dops_a 
Variable  coef  std error  t  Prob>t    N  5719 
ylc2  0.0066  0.0038  1.76  0.078    F  6.30 
ylc3  0.0162  0.0039  4.12  0.000    Prob > F  0.0003 
ylc4  0.0083  0.0110  0.75  0.454    R-squared  0.0033 
_cons  -0.0002  0.0013  -0.16  0.876    Adj. R-squared  0.0028 
Note: observations are weighted by batters faced.  
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Table 11:  Mean unexpected difference in OPS (OPS against) by deal length and years 
remaining on contract 
 
Panel A: Batters 
  0 yrs   1 yr  2-3  4+   
1 yr  0.0013  --  --  --   
1 + 1  0.0205  --  --  --   
2 yrs  0.0112  -0.0265  --  --   
3 – 4  -0.0043  0.0133  -0.0151  --   
5+  -0.0145  0.0033  0.0043  -0.0204   
 
Observations: 
  0 yrs  1 yr  2-3  4+  Total 
1 yr  3,852  --  --  --  3,852 
1 + 1  80  --  --  --  80 
2 yrs  298  334  --  --  632 
3 – 4  334  379  494  --  1,207 
5+  74  86  190  147  497 
Total  4,638  799  684  147  6,268 
 
Panel B: Pitchers 
  0 yrs  1 yr  2-3  4+   
1 yr  0.0001         
1 + 1  0.0006         
2 yrs  -0.0082  0.0153  -0.2142     
3 – 4  0.0020  -0.0037  0.0198  0.0148   
5+  -0.0274  -0.0003  0.0042  0.0093   
 
Observations: 
  0 yrs  1 yr  2-3  4+  Total 
1 yr  3,935        3,935 
1 + 1  66        66 
2 yrs  271  292  1    564 
3 – 4  214  263  351  3  831 
5+  15  18  36  29  98 
Total  4,501  573  388  32  5,494 
Note:  Rows represent contract length and columns represent years remaining on 
contract.  Measure reported is the component of differenced OPS (OPS against) that 
cannot be explained by variation in age group and performance quintile.   
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Table 12a: Contracts by contract length and performance quintile, hitters 
  q1  q2  q3  q4  q5  Total 
1 yr  1,649  1,476  1,346  1,125  844  6,440 
1+1  6  22  22  22  26  98 
2 yr  59  80  95  94  64  392 
3-4  32  59  79  110  124  404 
5+  9  12  13  29  60  123 
Total  1,755  1,649  1,555  1,380  1,118  7,457 
 
Row percentages: 
  q1  q2  q3  q4  q5  Total 
1 yr  25.61  22.92  20.90  17.47  13.11  100.00 
1+1  6.12  22.45  22.45  22.45  26.53  100.00 
2 yr  15.05  20.41  24.23  23.98  16.33  100.00 
3-4  7.92  14.60  19.55  27.23  30.69  100.00 
5+  7.32  9.76  10.57  23.58  48.78  100.00 
Total  23.53  22.11  20.85  18.51  14.99  100.00 
 
Column Percentages: 
  q1  q2  q3  q4  q5  Total 
1 yr  93.96  89.51  86.56  81.52  75.49  86.36 
1+1  0.34  1.33  1.41  1.59  2.33  1.31 
2 yr  3.36  4.85  6.11  6.81  5.72  5.26 
3-4  1.82  3.58  5.08  7.97  11.09  5.42 
5+  0.51  0.73  0.84  2.10  5.37  1.65 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of independence between contract length and performance 
quintile is rejected at the 1% significance level (
2=335.8, p = 0.000). 
  
    38 
Table 12b: Contracts by contract length and performance quintile, pitchers 
  q1  q2  q3  q4  q5  Total 
1 yr  1,493  1,263  1,175  1,077  998  6,006 
1 + 1  7  12  10  25  27  81 
2 yr  24  58  67  83  95  327 
3-4  16  64  70  75  82  307 
5 +   1  8  7  9  7  32 
Total  1,541  1,405  1,329  1,269  1,209  6,753  
 
Row percentages: 
  q1  q2  q3  q4  q5  Total 
1 yr  24.86  21.03  19.56  17.93  16.62  100.00 
1 + 1  8.64  14.81  12.35  30.86  33.33  100.00 
2 yr  7.34  17.74  20.49  25.38  29.05  100.00 
3-4  5.21  20.85  22.80  24.43  26.71  100.00 
5 +   3.13  25.00  21.88  28.13  21.88  100.00 
Total  22.82  20.81  19.68  18.79  17.90  100.00  
 
Column percentages: 
  q1  q2  q3  q4  q5  Total 
1 yr  96.89  89.89  88.41  84.87  82.55  88.94 
1 + 1  0.45  0.85  0.75  1.97  2.23  1.20 
2 yr  1.56  4.13  5.04  6.54  7.86  4.84 
3-4  1.04  4.56  5.27  5.91  6.78  4.55 
5 +   0.06  0.57  0.53  0.71  0.58  0.47 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of independence between contract length and performance 
quintile is rejected at the 1% significance level (
2=182.3, p = 0.000).  
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Table 13: Fraction of players with multi-year deals by performance quintile and CBA 
regime 
 
Panel A: Batters 
  q1  q2  q3  q4  q5  Total 
1981-85  0.2738  0.3378  0.3200  0.3261  0.4286  0.3200 
1986-89  0.0166  0.0241  0.0918  0.0881  0.0945  0.0518 
1990-94  0.0542  0.0674  0.0978  0.1672  0.1903  0.1088 
1995-01  0.0579  0.0979  0.1236  0.1820  0.2381  0.1355 
2002-06  0.0417  0.1003  0.1185  0.1747  0.2754  0.1325 
2007-  0.0794  0.2063  0.1471  0.2453  0.3030  0.1821 
Total  0.0570  0.0916  0.1203  0.1688  0.2218  0.1232 
                                
Panel B: Pitchers 
  q1  q2  q3  q4  q5  Total 
1981-85  0.1042  0.3265  0.1842  0.1778  0.1935  0.1991 
1986-89  0.0000  0.0488  0.0326  0.0613  0.0837  0.0493 
1990-94  0.0052  0.0485  0.0542  0.1032  0.1206  0.0722 
1995-01  0.0235  0.0704  0.1438  0.1623  0.1970  0.1086 
2002-06  0.0326  0.1299  0.1651  0.1791  0.1843  0.1189 
2007-  0.0522  0.2258  0.2432  0.2439  0.0952  0.1448 
Total  0.0266  0.0925  0.1084  0.1316  0.1522  0.0986  
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Table 14.  Probit regressions of the likelihood of a multi-year contract (2+ years), by 
experience group, for batters and pitchers.  
  Batters  Pitchers 
  All contracts  6+ yrs experience  All contracts  6+ yrs experience 
  mar eff  std err  mar eff  std err  mar eff  std err  mar eff  std err 
age 23-under  -0.0767
 A  0.0066  --  --  -0.0539
 A  0.0050  --  -- 
age 24-25  -0.0715
 A  0.0069  0.0053  0.1076  -0.0488
 A  0.0055  -0.0831   0.0731 
age 30-33  0.1001
 A  0.0113  0.0155  0.0184  0.0810
 A  0.0104  0.0392
 B  0.0201 
age 34-37  0.0716
 A  0.0149  -0.0383  0.0201  0.0752
 A  0.0153  0.0064  0.0241 
age 38-over  -0.0585
 A  0.0117  -0.1806
 A  0.0155  -0.0065  0.0134  -0.1131
 A  0.0223 
ops Q2  0.0440
 A  0.0135  0.0570
 B  0.0272  0.1066
 A  0.0175  0.2053
 A  0.0482 
ops Q3  0.0955
 A  0.0157  0.1402
 A  0.0303  0.1234
 A  0.0188  0.2166
 A  0.0459 
ops Q4  0.1706
 A  0.0188  0.2231
 A  0.0323  0.1667
 A  0.0215  0.2739
 A  0.0468 
ops Q5  0.2728
 A  0.0233  0.3384
 A  0.0366  0.1896
 A  0.0233  0.3146
 A  0.0485 
LH closer          0.2730
 A  0.0576  0.4854
 A  0.0755 
LH mid-relief          0.0319
 A  0.0116  0.1007
 A  0.0315 
LH starter          0.1888
 A  0.0220  0.3456
 A  0.0408 
RH closer          0.0946
 A  0.0182  0.2141
 A  0.0407 
RH starter          0.1167
 A  0.0119  0.2213
 A  0.0270 
2B  0.0144  0.0150  0.0087  0.0316         
3B  -0.0003  0.0132  -0.0447  0.0265         
C  0.0161  0.0137  0.0262  0.0290         
DH  -0.0228  0.0325  -0.0414  0.0639         
OF  0.0047  0.0106  -0.0020  0.0233         
SS  0.0715
 A  0.0200  0.0902
 B  0.0401         
cba 1981-85  0.3428
 A  0.0388  0.4451
 A  0.0478  0.1806
 A  0.0385  0.3567
 A  0.0627 
cba 1990-94  0.0605
 A  0.0154  0.1386
 A  0.0322  0.0337
 A  0.0130  0.0908
 A  0.0354 
cba 1995-01  0.0723
 A  0.0139  0.1535
 A  0.0291  0.0867
 A  0.0131  0.2241
 A  0.0332 
cba 2002-06  0.0693
 A  0.0163  0.0927
 A  0.0311  0.1180
 A  0.0186  0.2196
 A  0.0381 
cba 2007  0.1441
 A  0.0332  0.2096
 A  0.0543  0.2091
 A  0.0392  0.3465
 A  0.0639 
                 
N  7457  3035  6753  2408 
2  774.7  291.4  802.8  275.5 
P > 
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R
2  0.1391  0.0900  0.1846  0.1107 
Note: Omitted categories -- Age group: 26 – 29, Performance quintile: q1, Batter 
Position: 1B, Pitcher role: RH middle relief, CBA Regime: 1986-1989.  
A Coefficient significant at 99% sig. 
B Coefficient significant at 95% sig. 
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Table 15.  Ordered probit regressions of the likelihood of increasingly long contracts, by 
experience group, for batters and pitchers.  
  Batters  Pitchers 
  All contracts  6+ yrs experience  All contracts  6+ yrs experience 
  coeff  std err  coeff  std err  coeff  std err  coeff  std err 
age 23-under  -0.7025
 A  0.0902  --  --  -0.7598
 A  0.1116  --  -- 
age 24-25  -0.5583
 A  0.0699  0.0553  0.3498  -0.6103
 A  0.0847  -0.2726  0.3747 
age 30-33  0.4693
 A  0.0463  -0.0023  0.0605  0.5542
 A  0.0531  0.1286  0.0694 
age 34-37  0.3289
 A  0.0604  -0.2135
 A  0.0712  0.4521
 A  0.0714  -0.0496  0.0838 
age 38-over  -0.4039
 A  0.1331  -0.9525
 A  0.1385  0.0644  0.1147  -0.4614
 A  0.1227 
ops Q2  0.2849
 A  0.0672  0.2424
 A  0.0847  0.7060
 A  0.0861  0.6922
 A  0.1285 
ops Q3  0.5222
 A  0.0669  0.5006
 A  0.0860  0.7691
 A  0.0869  0.6927
 A  0.1265 
ops Q4  0.8252
 A  0.0670  0.7722
 A  0.0867  0.9823
 A  0.0875  0.9282
 A  0.1267 
ops Q5  1.2015
 A  0.0703  1.2112
 A  0.0925  1.0614
 A  0.0895  1.0500
 A  0.1291 
LH closer          1.1082
 A  0.1491  1.2505
 A  0.1814 
LH mid-relief          0.2133
 A  0.0759  0.3088
 A  0.0936 
LH starter          1.0019
 A  0.0773  1.0825
 A  0.1007 
RH closer          0.5630
 A  0.0805  0.6376
 A  0.1032 
RH starter          0.8295
 A  0.0630  0.8045
 A  0.0793 
2B  0.1268  0.0801  0.0765  0.1021         
3B  0.0229  0.0773  -0.1175  0.0976         
C  0.1202  0.0736  0.1433  0.0912         
DH  -0.1098  0.2243  -0.2057  0.2398         
OF  0.0544  0.0614  0.0225  0.0767         
SS  0.4303
 A  0.0827  0.3796
 A  0.1112         
cba 1981-85  1.3500
 A  0.0969  1.4603
 A  0.1197  1.0513
 A  0.1217  1.2409
 A  0.1487 
cba 1990-94  0.3223
 A  0.0731  0.4307
 A  0.0915  0.3067
 A  0.0883  0.3939
 A  0.1089 
cba 1995-01  0.4132
 A  0.0685  0.5083
 A  0.0861  0.6735
 A  0.0812  0.7743
 A  0.0999 
cba 2002-06  0.4193
 A  0.0729  0.3496
 A  0.0916  0.7962
 A  0.0864  0.7987
 A  0.1062 
cba 2007  0.7281
 A  0.1038  0.7456
 A  0.1297  1.1200
 A  0.1177  1.1664
 A  0.1496 
_cut1  2.216  1.621  3.175  2.686 
_cut2  2.289  1.721  3.256  2.800 
_cut3  2.648  2.189  3.682  3.307 
_cut4  3.414  3.039  4.814  4.501 
         
N  7457  3035  6753  2408 
2  916.8  426.2  935.8  345.2 
P > 
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R
2  0.1090  0.0799  0.1475  0.0863 
Note: Omitted categories -- Age group: 26 – 29, Performance quintile: q1, Batter 
Position: 1B, Pitcher role: RH middle relief, CBA Regime: 1986-1989.  
A Coefficient significant at 99% sig.  
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Table 16.  OLS regressions of log-salary, for batters and pitchers 
  Batters  Pitchers 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
lnsalary  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
arbit  0.770
 A  0.027  0.707
 A  0.023  0.692
 A  0.025  0.677
 A  0.022 
free  1.692
 A  0.033  1.355
 A  0.029  1.454
 A  0.031  1.239
 A  0.028 
ops  1.197
 A  0.066  0.806
 A  0.057  -0.256
 A  0.067  -0.156
 A  0.060 
ops Q2  0.154
 A  0.025  0.145
 A  0.022  0.214
 A  0.026  0.150
 A  0.023 
ops Q3  0.329
 A  0.026  0.261
 A  0.023  0.416
 A  0.027  0.337
 A  0.024 
ops Q4  0.591
 A  0.028  0.426
 A  0.024  0.478
 A  0.028  0.361
 A  0.025 
ops Q5  1.012
 A  0.030  0.698
 A  0.027  0.604
 A  0.029  0.471
 A  0.027 
1st base  -0.020,  0.026  0.005  0.022         
2nd base  0.077
 A  0.027  0.063
 A  0.023         
3rd base  -0.058
 B  0.027  -0.045
 B  0.023         
Catcher  -0.137
 A  0.025  -0.127
 A  0.021         
Des. hitter  0.171  0.094  0.264
 A  0.080         
Shortstop  0.265
 A  0.028  0.144
 A  0.024         
LH closer          0.652
 A  0.066  0.473
 A  0.060 
LH mid-rel.          -0.027  0.025  -0.050
 B  0.023 
LH starter          0.793
 A  0.027  0.591
 A  0.025 
RH closer          0.529
 A  0.030  0.423
 A  0.027 
RH starter          0.794
 A  0.021  0.639
 A  0.019 
age 23-u  -0.435
 A  0.037  -0.377
 A  0.032  -0.444
 A  0.034  -0.390
 A  0.030 
age 24-25  -0.238
 A  0.028  -0.221
 A  0.024  -0.267
 A  0.026  -0.230
 A  0.024 
age 30-33  0.020  0.025  -0.034  0.021  0.097
 A  0.025  0.038  0.022 
age 34-37  -0.129
 A  0.031  -0.046  0.027  0.098
 A  0.033  0.058
 B  0.029 
age 38-up  -0.262
 A  0.053  0.016  0.046  -0.047  0.049  0.074  0.044 
newstad  -0.027  0.030  -0.030  0.025  0.000  0.030  -0.005  0.027 
newstadsoon  -0.082
 B  0.035  -0.076
 B  0.030  0.000  0.035  -0.014  0.032 
teamsalhi  0.128
 A  0.020  0.064
 A  0.017  0.239
 A  0.021  0.177
 A  0.019 
teamsallo  -0.155
 A  0.021  -0.102
 A  0.018  -0.173
 A  0.021  -0.142
 A  0.019 
2d yr of c.      -0.338
 A  0.097      -0.183  0.131 
3rd/4th yr.      -0.424
 A  0.116      -0.393
 B  0.165 
5+ yr of c.      -0.755
 A  0.239      -1.367
 A  0.457 
1+1 deal      0.162
 B  0.068      0.164
 B  0.072 
2 yr deal      0.509
 A  0.027      0.617
 A  0.028 
3-4 yr deal      1.120
 A  0.022      1.004
 A  0.025 
5+ yr deal      1.312
 A  0.033      1.214
 A  0.063 
N (observations)  9406  9406  7968  7968 
Adj. R-squared  .6735  .7599  .7023  .7608 
F-stat  441.9  584.5  438.0  507.9 
Note: Omitted categories -- Age group: 26 – 29, Performance quintile: Q1, Batter 
Position: OF, Pitcher role: RH middle relief.   
Regressions also included set of annual fixed effects.  
A Coefficient significant at 99% sig. 
 B Coefficient significant at 95% sig.  
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Table 17.  Two-stage least squares regressions of (1) contract length (in years) and (2) 
ln(salary), for batters and pitchers.  
  Batters  Pitchers 
  Deal length  ln(salary)  Deal length  ln(salary) 
  coeff  std err  coeff  std err  coeff  std err  coeff  std err 
ln(salary)  0.862 
A  0.013      0.527 
A  0.012     
deal length      0.811 
A  0.163      1.602 
A  0.246 
age 23-under   0.669
 A  0.046       0.330
 A  0.035     
age 24-25   0.462
 A  0.037       0.165
 A  0.028     
age 30-33  -0.074
 B  0.030      0.010
   0.025     
age 34-37  -0.309
 A  0.039      -0.087
 A  0.033     
age 38-over  -0.727
 A  0.071      -0.442
 A  0.051     
OPS / OPSalwd      0.654 
A  0.093      -0.179 
B  0.088 
ops Q2      0.152
 A  0.026      0.064
 C  0.038 
ops Q3      0.249
 A  0.027      0.231
 A  0.040 
ops Q4      0.367
 A  0.034      0.213
 A  0.046 
ops Q5      0.461
 A  0.069      0.310
 A  0.050 
LH closer             0.122 
C  0.072  0.350
 A  0.091 
LH mid-relief             0.070 
B  0.028  -0.043
    0.033 
LH starter             0.151 
A  0.031  0.281
 A  0.065 
RH closer           0.012  0.033  0.326
 A  0.045 
RH starter          -0.003  0.025  0.410
 A  0.047 
1B  -0.117    0.037   0.024  0.027         
2B  -0.112 
A  0.038      0.065 
B  0.028 
   
   
3B  -0.003   0.037  -0.042  0.027         
C   0.066 
C  0.034    -0.115 
A  0.025 
   
   
DH  -0.308 
B  0.131     0.390 
A  0.099 
   
   
SS  0.082
 B  0.039  0.059  0.036         
free agent        1.404
 A  0.065          1.212
 A  0.069 
arbitration        0.857
 A  0.024          0.817
 A  0.029 
New stadium      0.011
   0.032       0.061
   0.041 
New stad. soon        -0.069
 C  0.036      -0.050
   0.047 
High Payroll       -0.022
   0.032         0.082 
B   0.033 
Low Payroll        -0.073 
A  0.023        -0.136 
A  0.028 
intercept  -9.902 
A  0.170     9.792 
A  0.147  -5.638 
A  0.150     9.530 
A  0.236 
         
N  9406  9406  7968  7968 
F – statistic  487.4  469.0  335.9  267.6 
Pseudo R
2  0.3634  0.6661  0.3112  0.4860 
Note: Omitted categories -- Age group: 26 – 29, Performance quintile: q1, Batter 
Position: OF, Pitcher role: RH middle relief.  The ln(salary) model included annual fixed-
effects. 
A Coefficient significant at 99% level.   
B Coefficient significant at 95% level.   
C Coefficient significant at 90% level. 
 